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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WOODLAND THEATRES, INC.,
a corporation,
Case No. 14440

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 14441

vs.
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES,
INC., a corporation, and
PLITT INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES,
INC., a corporation,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
INTRODUCTION
This reply brief is filed in order to dispel any false
impressions that may have been left by the Brief of DefendantRespondent in this appeal.

The defendant-respondent Plitt Inter-

mountain Theatres, Incorporated (hereinafter "Plitt") has argued
in its brief from a succession of extremely broad generalizations
that have no meaning in the context of this appeal unless they are
carefully and precisely qualified.

The plaintiff-appellant

Woodland Theatres, Incorporated (hereinafter "Woodland") hereby
replies to Plitt1s brief in order to insure that this Court has a
clear and unambiguous statement of the issues in this appeal before
it.
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Woodland agrees with Plitt that, "The basic issue presented for determination by this court is whether by acceptance
of rental payments under the lease, with knowledge of the alleged
breaches, the lessor [Woodland] waived those breaches," (Brief
of Defendant-Respondent at 12.)

However, Plitt's conclusions

on the issue of waiver, as outlined in its brief, are contrary
to the authorities it cites and are clearly erroneous in the
context of this appeal.
I.

Acceptance of Rental Payments does not Waive

Forfeiture of the Leasehold as a Matter of Law.

Plitt is clearly

wrong in arguing that the acceptance of rental payments with
knowledge of breaches of a lease agreement constitutes waiver
of the breaches as a matter of law. Waiver, as it applies to
forfeiture of a leasehold, is a matter of the lessor's intent,
as manifested verbally, in writing, or by conduct.

Certainly,

the acceptance of rent by a landlord may be an indicator that the
landlord regards the lease as subsisting and thus waives the
available forfeiture remedy.

Yet, interpreting a landlord's

acceptance of rent as a demonstration in some instances of his
intent to waive forfeiture under the lease agreement is far from
recognizing as a graven principle that the acceptance of rent
waives a forfeiture of the leasehold as a matter of law. This
Court has observed the distinction if Plitt's counsel has not.
' -2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507
P.2d 713 (1973), the Utah Supreme Court carefully analyzed the
implications of plaintiffs' actions in determining the waiver
issue.

An intent to waive was deduced from the plaintiffs' con-

duct, but in no way did the plaintiffs' acceptance of rent resolve
the issue as a matter of law.
The conduct of plaintiffs over the period of
years in which Dan's remained in possession,
particularly after they received written
notification that the option to renew was
being exercised and they accepted the increased rental payment, constituted a waiver
of their right to demand a forfeiture for
breach of the condition against assignment
without written consent. Jensen v. O.K.
Investment Corp., 29 Utah 2d 231, 507 P.2d
713, 717 (1973) (emphasis added).
Utah is not alone in determining the issue of waiver from the
parties' intent as indicated by the parties' words or conduct, as
an examination of authorities from other jurisdictions clearly
demonstrates.

See Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir.

1959); Bailey v. Zlotnick, 133 F.2d 35, 36 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Edwards
Fine Furniture, Inc. v. Ditullio, 252 N.E. 2d 348, 349 (Mass. 1969);
Weiss v. Johnson, 190 N.E. 2d 834, 836 (111. 1963); Venters v.
Reynolds, 354 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Ky. 1962); Wing,

Inc.

v. Arnold,

107 So.2d 765, 768 (Fla. 1959); Fredeking v. Grimmett, 96 S.E.2d
554, 563 (W. Va. 1955); Larsen v. Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177, 182
(Wyo. 1951); Borst v. Ruff, 77 A.2d 343, 344 (Conn. 1950); Miller
v. Reidy, 260 P. 358, 360 (Cal. 1927); Jones v. Delia Maria, 191
P. 943 (Cal. 1920); Sanders v. Sutlive Bros. & Co., 174 N.W. 267,
268 (Iowa 1919); Katz v. Miller, 133 N.W. 1091, 1093 (Wis. 1912).
Woodland has already outlined in its initial brief
the factual
circumstances tending to establish that any rental
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

payments accepted from Plitt were accepted pursuant to a
tentative settlement agreement without prejudice to Woodland's
rights to renew its lawsuits in case the settlement broke down,
as in fact it did.

(Brief of Appellant at 9-10f 15.)

As the

court stated in Jones v. Delia Maria, 191 P. 943 (Cal. 1920),
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right, or such conduct as warrants an
inference of the relinquishment of such right—
an election by one to forego some advantage he
could have taken or insisted upon. A person
who is in a position to assert a right or
insist upon an advantage may, by his words or
conduct, and without reference to any act or
conduct of the other party affected thereby,
waive such right.
However, a personfs words or conduct when laid before the court
at trial may also demonstrate an intent contrary to the waiver
of forfeiture.

In relation to this appeal/ Woodland has had no

opportunity to establish the inconsistency of its actions with
the waiver of Plitt1s forfeiture of the leasehold.

Woodland

deserves a chance to prove that its objective actions belied
any intent to waive Plitt's forfeiture of the Woodland DriveIn Theatre leasehold, and accordingly, the district court's
summary judgment order should be overturned.
II.

The Rule of Waiver does not apply to Claims for Damages.

Acceptance of rental payments has no bearing whatsoever on a
lessor's right to maintain a suit for damages on the basis of
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the lessee's breaches of the lease agreement.

The authorities

cited by Plitt in support of its concept of waiver do not apply
waiver in relation to a lessor's suit for damages claiming
breach by the lessee.

See, e.g., Jensen v. O.K. Investment Corp.,

29 Utah 2d 233, 507 P.2d 713 (1973); Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270
F.2d 943 (8th Cir. 1959); Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S.2d 293
(1972); Major v. Hall, 251 So. 2d 444 (La. 1971); Roseman v.
Day, 184 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. 1962); Wing, Inc. v. Arnold, 107 So.
2d 765 (Fla. 1959); Snyder v. Hall, 45 N.W.2d 757 (Neb. 1951);
Larsen v. Sjogren, 226 P.2d 177 (Wyo. 1951); Bedford Investment
Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361, 363 (Cal. 1947); Jones v. Delia Maria,
191 P. 943 (Cal. 1920); Guptill v. Macon Stone Supply Co., 79
S.E. 854 (Ga. 1913).

In fact, in one of the cases cited by

Plitt in its brief to this Court, Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S.2d
293 (1972), the court specifically points out the right of the
lessor to bring a suit at law for damages resulting from the
lessee's alleged breaches of the lease agreement.
Judgment may be entered for the respondent without
prejudice to a suit at law for damages for the alleged failure to pay the tax increase and without
prejudice to a new proceeding for the alleged violation of the use provision of the lease. Id. at 296.
This last aspect of the court's ruling follows its determination
that the lessor had waived the lessee's forfeiture of the leasehold for precisely the same alleged breaches by accepting rental
payments.
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plitt relies heavily on the case of Bedford Investment Co, v, Folb, 180 P.2d 361 (Cal. 1947), to establish that
a landlord waives all breaches of the lease agreement by the
lessee and all damages occasioned thereby by accepting payments
of rent.

In Bedfordy the court

ruled that respondent lessor

was not entitled to damages in the amount of the rental value
($8.33 per day) from May 31r 1946 to date and could not bring
suit to collect such damages.

However, the court's ruling was

based on uncontroverted evidence in the record before it establishing that the appellants lessees had paid their rent to the
lessor pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement "right up to
date."

Bedford Investment Co. v. Folb, 180 P.2d 361, 362-63

(Cal. 1947).

The Bedford decision was thus based on the fact

that the lessor had no damages in terms of lost rental and in no
way supports or even states the idea that a lessor waives the
opportunity to sue for damages resulting from the lessee's breaches
by accepting payments of rent.
The ultimate result of Plitt1s argument that by accepting rental payments, a landlord waives all breaches of the
lease agreement

is to require a lessor to immediately declare

a forfeiture of the lease agreement and refuse to accept further
rental payments in order to file

suit for damages caused by

any breach of the lease agreement, no
variety of breach is involved.

matter what magnitude or

Otherwise, the opportunity to

litigate a claim for damages against the lessee would be lost
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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through the all-encompassing application of the waiver principle.

Obviously, no such result is required by the authorities

that have considered the waiver question.

In fact, quite the

opposite is true, as the Atkinson court and other courts hav£
confirmed.

Cf.

Wecht v. Anderson, 444 P.2d 501 (Nev. 1968);

Klein v. Longo, 34 A.2d 359 (Mun. Ct., D.C. 1943).
Whatever result is reached in this action on the issue
of waiver of Plitt's forfeiture of the leasehold, it should
have no impact on Woodland's right to maintain its action for
damages resulting from Plitt's breaches

of the lease agreement.

Plitt's payments of rent cannot compensate Woodland for the
damages occasioned by Plitt's breaches of the lease agreement.
The district court's summary judgment order would deny Woodland
the right to establish its damages.

Such preclusion is unwar-

ranted by the facts of this action and by the authorities
that have expressed themselves on the waiver issue. Accordingly,
the district court's summary judgment ruling as it applies to
Woodland's claims for damages resulting from Plitt's breaches
of the lease agreement should be reversed.
III.

rhere is an Implied Covenant under the Lease Agreement

for Plitt to operate the Drive-in Theatre in a Prudent and a
Businesslike Fashion.

Plitt asserts in its brief to this Court

that "not only is the lessee under no obligation to maximize
the lessor's percentage rental, but as long as he pays the minimum rental, he has no obligation even to do business on the
by the Howard
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School,
premises." Digitized
(Brief
of W.Defendant-Respondent
at BYU.
40.)
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plitt com-

pletely misses Woodland's point with regard to performance under
the lease agreement.

Plitt did not choose to allow the Woodland

Drive-In Theatre to sit idle while Plitt paid the minimum rent
provided for in the lease agreement to Woodland,

Plitt ran the

drive-in theatre business, and it is Woodland's complaint that
through improper maintenance and neglect of the physical plant
of the theatre, Plitt allowed the business of the theatre to
deteriorate so that Woodland's receipts under the percentage
rental provisions of the lease were artificially limited.
What Woodland is attempting to establish through its
claims that Plitt (and formerly, ABC Intermountain Theatres,
Incorporated) failed to operate the theatre in a prudent,
diligent and businesslike manner is the damages to Woodland
resulting from Plitt's neglectful operation and faulty maintenance
of the Woodland Drive-in Theatre. Woodland does not presume
to set a particular level of performance for Plitt's conduct
of the drive-in theatre business.

However, it is Woodland's

contention that Plitt allowed the physical plant of the theat3:e
to deteriorate so greatly that many potential theatre patrons
were repelled by the theatre's state of disrepair and others
had to be turned away because Plitt and/or ABC had failed to
maintain facilities adequate to serve them.

Woodland's claim

plainly presents a question of fact that cannot be disposed of
by summary judgment, and Woodland should have the opportunity
to present its supporting evidence before the trier of fact.

-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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One thing is clear from the cases cited by Plitt in
its brief to this Court, and that is that percentage rental
provisions are in the nature of agreements "sui generis" and
must be interpreted according to their own peculiar terms. See
Percoff v. Solomon, 67 So. 2d 31, 39 (Ala. 1953).

See also Stern

v. The Dunlap Co., 228 F.2d 939 (10th Cir. 1955); Monte Corp. v.
Stephens, 324 P.2d 538 (Okla. 1958); Weil v. Ann Lewis Shops,
281 S.W.2d 651 (Tex. 1955); Masciotra v. Harlow, 233 P.2d 586
(Cal. 1951); Palm v. Mortgage Investment Co., 229 S.W.2d 869
(Tex. 1950); Cousins Investment Co. v. Hastings Clothing Co.,
113 P.2d 878 (Cal. 1941).

In Stern v. The Dunlap Co., 228 F.2d

939 (10th Cir. 1955), the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated
the standard for finding an implied covenant

or obligation in

relation to a contractual agreement otherwise written.
[I]f it is clear from all of the pertinent
parts or provisions of the contract, taken
together and considered in the light of the
facts and circumstances surrounding the
parties at the time of its execution, that
the obligation in question was within the
contemplation of the parties or was necessary
to carry their intention into effect, it will
be implied and enforced. Id. at 943.
The percentage rental provisions relevant in this
action provide for payments of fifteen percent (15%) of the
gross admission receipts above $183,333.00 and fifteen percent
(15%) of the gross concession receipts in excess of $65,000.
The derelictions of the defendants-respondents Plitt and ABC
responsible for limiting Woodland's receipts under the percentage
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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rental provisions of the lease agreement have been previously
outlined in appellant Woodland's initial brief to this Court.
What Woodland is asking for is damages resulting from Plitt's
and ABC's failure to operate the Drive-In Theatre in a prudent
and businesslike fashion.

Such prudent and businesslike opera-

tion , if the theatre business was run at all, was certainly
envisaged in the lease agreementf and Woodland is entitled to
an opportunity to present its case to prove its harm.
has presented a clear issue of fact.

Woodland

The district court's

summary judgment ruling should thus be overturned and Woodland's
action reinstated.
CONCLUSION
In its brief to this Court, Plitt has relied on
a series of overly broad propositions to obfuscate the legal
principles that clearly apply in relation to this appeal.
principles are:

Those

(1) Waiver of a lessee's forfeiture of the

leasehold is a matter of the lessor's intent, to be gathered by
the trier of fact from the lessor's words, writings and conduct.

The acceptance of rent by the lessor does not waive the

lessee's forfeiture as a matter of law.

(2) Acceptance of

rent does not waive the lessor's right to bring a suit for
damages resulting from the lessee's breach of the lease agreement.

(3) An implied covenant may be found from the lease

agreement itself or from the facts and circumstances surrouning its execution.
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Woodland has had no opportunity to present its claims,
and such an opportunity is clearly mandated by the record in
this action to date.

Plitt is not entitled to judgment as a

matter of law, and accordingly the district court's summary
judgment rulings should be reversed.
DATED this 1*%k> day of November, 1976.
BERMAN & GIAUQUE
Daniel L. Berman
Richard D. Burbidge
Randall L. Dunn
500 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
(801) 533-8383

By (lfi/\;J~Ajl, X. XT
Randall L. Dunn
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant
Woodland Theatres, Inc.
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